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Walter Huang, a 38-year-old Apple Inc. engineer, died on March
23, 2018, aer his Tesla Model X crashed into a highway barrier in
Mountain View, California.1 Tesla immediately disavowed respon-
sibility for the accident. “e fundamental premise of both moral
and legal liability is a broken promise, and there was none here: [Mr.
Huang] was well aware that theAutopilotwas not perfect [and the]
only way for this accident to have occurred is if Mr. Huang was
not paying aention to the road, despite the car providing multiple
warnings to do so.”2
is is the standard response from Tesla and Uber, the manufac-
turers of the automated vehicles involved in the six fatal accidents
to date: the automated vehicle isnfit perfect, the driver knew it was-
nfit perfect, and if only the driver had been paying aention and
heeded the vehiclefis warnings, the accident would never have oc-
curred.3 However, as researchers focused on human-automation
interaction in aviation and military operations, we cannot help but
wonder if there really are no broken promises and no legal liabili-
ties.
ese automated vehicle accidents are predicted by the science
of human-automation interaction and the major aviation accidents
caused, in large part, by naı¨ve implementation of automation in
the cockpit and airspace. Aviation has historically been plagued by
designers ignoring defects until they have caused fatal accidents.
We even have a term for this aitude: tombstone design. Acknowl-
edging tragedies and the need to beer understand their causes led
1See hps://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-12/a-timeline-of-the-tesla-autopilot-crash-investigation.
2See hps://assets.bwbx.io/documents/users/iqjWHBFdfxIU/rr5U4aZLWK5A/v0.
3Aer fatal accidents in China and Florida in 2016, Tesla responded that “every time
the Autopilot is engaged, the car reminds the driver to ‘Always keep your hands on the
wheel. Be prepared to take over at any time’ ” (hps://www.tesla.com/blog/tragic-loss).
Aer a fatal accident in Arizona in March, 2018, Uber responded by in-
stalling new driver monitoring systems for detecting “inaentive behavior”
(hps://www.theverge.com/2018/7/24/17607898/uber-self-driving-car-public-roads-driver-monitoring).
Aer the fourth fatal Tesla accident in Delray Beach, Florida, in
2019, Tesla responded that “when used properly by an aentive dri-
ver who is prepared to take control at all times, drivers supported
by Autopilot are safer than those operating without assistance.”
(hps://www.forbes.com/sites/alanohnsman/2019/05/16/investigators-say-tesla-model-3-driver-killed-in-florida-crash-used-autopilot/).
© 2016 ACM. is is the author’s version of the work. It is posted here for your
personal use. Not for redistribution. e definitive Version of Record was published
in , hp://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3342102.
aviation to become the canonical domain for understanding human-
automation interaction in complex, safety-critical operations. To-
day, aviation is an incredibly safe mode of transportation, but we
are constantly reminded of why we must respect the realities of
human-automation interaction. A recent tragic example is Boeing
737 MAX 8’s MCAS automation which contributed to two crashes
and the deaths of 346 people before the human-automation inter-
action failure was publicly acknowledged.
Science like human-automation interaction has a critical role in
determining legal liability, and courts appropriately rely on scien-
tists and engineers to determine whether an accident, or harm, was
foreseeable. Specifically, a designer could be found liable if, at the
time of the accident, scientists knew there was a systematic rela-
tionship between the accident and the designerfis untaken precau-
tion [Grady 2002].
e scientific evidence is undeniable. ere is a systematic rela-
tionship between the design of automated vehicles and the types
of accidents that are occurring now and will inevitably continue to
occur in the future. ese accidents were not unforeseeable and the
drivers were not exclusively to blame. In fact, the vehicle designs
and fatalities are both symptoms of a larger failed system: the five
levels of automation (LOA) for automated vehicles.
e LOA framework is defined in the SAE International J3016
Standard (SAE J3016)[SAE 2018] and adopted as the U.S. National
Highway Transportation Safety Administration’s (NHTSA) stan-
dard automated vehicle categories [NHT 2018]. e LOA frame-
work is premised on the idea that automation is collaborating at
various levels of interaction as part of a team with a human op-
erator. e typical LOA is a one-dimensional spectrum of interac-
tion ranging from fully-manual to fully-automated, exemplified by
NHTSA’s Level 0 and Level 5. For their part, SAE states that their
LOA “provides a logical taxonomy for [classification]… in order to
facilitate clear communications” and caveats that their LOA “is not
a specification and imposes no requirements” [SAE 2018].
e central fl aw of LOA is right there in its name. Levels of au-
tomation focus on a singular, static definition of the automationfis
capabilities, ignoring the deeper ideas of teamwork, collaboration,
and interdependency necessary for mission success fi in this case
operating a vehicle. Just reading the names of NHTSAfis levels, you
can see that the focus is solely on what the automation can do: 0 -
No Driving Automation; 1 - Driver Assistance; 2 - Partial Driving
Automation; 3 - Conditional Driving Automation; 4 - High Driving
Automation; 5 - Full Driving Automation.
is automation-centric perspective is counter to the idea of team-
work and explains why, despite their former prevalence in the aca-
demic literature, LOA is now acknowledged to be limited, prob-
lematic, and, to some, worth discarding altogether [Bradshaw et al.
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2013; Feigh and Pritche 2014].. Even Tom Sheridan, who origi-
nated the idea of LOA in 1978 [Sheridan and Verplank 1978], ex-
plained recently that LOA was never intended to be “a prescription
for designing automation” and that the NHTSA’s categories for au-
tomated vehicles is a key example of “LOA that are not appropriate
to [their] given context,” not only in design but also in taxonomy
and communication [Sheridan 2018].4
e scientific literature shows that today’s automated vehicles
and corresponding LOA are characterized by the same serious de-
sign and communication flaws that human-automation interaction
engineers have been fighting for nearly 70 years: automating as
much as possible without concern for the human operatorfis capa-
bilities or needs; relying on hidden, interdependent and coupled
tasks for safety; and requiring the operator to immediately take
over control in emergency situations without explicit support.
To make some of these reasons more salient, imagine that you
are part of a two-person team required to complete an assignment.
Imagine that only your teammate was given the instructions for
what was needed to complete the assignment. Conversely, you
were only told that at some point your teammate may be unable to
complete the assignment and, without prior notice, you will need
to immediately finish it. You were also told that if your team fails
to complete the assignment it is entirely your fault.
Is this a recipe for good teamwork and success? Would you feel
the need to constantly monitor your teammate? Would you feel
like you have all the responsibility for the outcome but limited or
no ability to affect it? At what point would it be easier to just do
the work on your own?
With this example in mind, consider the definition of NHTSAfis
Level 2 Partial Driving Automation. is is currently the highest
level of automation allowed without formal regulation in many U.S.
states and the level for each of the five fatal Tesla accidents.
SAE J3016 Level 2 Partial Driving Automation:
e driving automation system (while engaged)
performs part of the dynamic driving task by
executing both the lateral and the longitudinal
vehicle motion control subtasks, and disengages
immediately upon driver request;
e human driver (at all times) performs the
remainder of the [dynamic driving task] not per-
formed by the driving automation system; su-
pervises the driving automation system and in-
tervenes as necessary to maintain safe opera-
tion of the vehicle; determines whether/when
engagement and disengagement of the driving
automation system is appropriate; immediately
performs the entire [dynamic driving task] when-
ever required or desired.
Level 2 is the first point where the automation assumes full con-
trol of the foundational “lateral and longitudinal vehicle motion
control subtasks” typically performed by human drivers such as
lane centering, parking assist, and adaptive cruise control. e fi
4For a thorough discussion of the problems of current single-dimensional LOA and
how they can be modified to account for human capabilities and needs, see the special
issue on Advancing Models of Human-Automation Interaction in the Journal of Cogni-
tive Engineering and Decision Making (hp://journals.sagepub.com/toc/edma/12/1).
rst stated role of the human driver in Level 2 is to “(at all times) [per-
form] the remainder of the [dynamic driving task] not performed
by the driving automation system.” ese remaining tasks include
supervising the automation and intervening as necessary based on
object and event detection.
is is where LOA begins to show itself to be inappropriate for
design, taxonomy, or communication of the safety-critical aspects
of human-automation interaction in driving contexts as alluded to
by Sheridan [Sheridan 2018]. ese remaining tasks are the text-
book definition of leover allocation: automate as many tasks as
technologywill permit and assume the humanwill pick upwhichever
tasks are leover [Bainbridge 1983]. Leover allocation oen re-
sults in incoherent sets of tasks and situations where humans are
being required to monitor automation or the environment for con-
ditions beyond which the automation can operate [Wiener and Curry
1980] – situations inwhich humans are ineffective [Molloy and Parasuraman
1996].
Level 2 is oversimplifying and obscuring the interdependence of
the human driver and the automated driving system, assuming that
the human driverfis leover tasks are complete, coherent, and ca-
pable of being performed. By focusing on “who does what,” instead
of emphasizing “how to work together,” the LOA is giving “the illu-
sion that we can successfully deploy automation by simply assign-
ing functions to automation that were once performed by people…
[Neglecting] the fact that such assignments do not simply substi-
tute automation for people but create new functions for the people
who are le to manage the automation” [Lee 2018].
Level 2’s distribution of tasks is particularly troubling because
engineers have known since the 1950s that monitoring is not a
task humans can maintain for extended periods of time [Fis 1951].
When a driver’s interactions are limited to monitoring, they will
lose real-time situation awareness, which can result in surprises.
Workload will spike during off -nominal situations and be exces-
sively low during normal operations between spikes, ultimately
leading to humanswho are notionally “in-the-loop” becoming, prac-
tically, “out-of-the-loop” [Bainbridge 1983]. ese spikes and lulls
in workload can lead to the well-recognized problem of automation
bias where humans will tend to disregard or not search for contra-
dictory information in light of an automated judgment or decision
that is accepted as correct [Parasuraman and Riley 1997]. Beyond
automation bias, the lack of system interaction over a prolonged
period prevents the human from acquiring expertise in the first
place and can lead to long-term knowledge and skill degradation
[Feigh and Pritche 2014]. Combining this degradation with an in-
coherent set of leover tasks will make it all but impossible for a
driver to make an informed decision in an emergency situation.
e Level 2 Partial Automation Vehicle standard concludes with
a final, fatal flaw: requiring the human operator to determine “whether/when
engagement and disengagement of the driving automation system
is appropriate,” and if disengagement is necessary, “immediately
[perform] the entire [dynamic driving task].” In complexwork envi-
ronments such as automated vehicles wheremany tasks are interde-
pendent and hidden, the driver is unlikely to knowwhen disengage-
ment is “appropriate” – especially given the ambiguity built into the
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: January 2016.
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SAE standard.5 Studies have shown that these hidden interdepen-
dencies can result in insufficient coordination and exacerbate work-
load lulls and spikes [Feigh and Pritche 2014]. is makes for a
prototypically brile human-automated system because there is no
discussion of how the human operator should be supported dur-
ing disengagement or takeover in emergency situations [Norman
1990].
With this extensive history of human-automation interaction sci-
ence we can now perform the foreseeability analysis the law re-
quires: Is there existing scientific evidence for a relationship be-
tween the accidents like the one that killed Mr. Huang and the
design of Level 2 Partial Automation Vehicles?
In short, yes. Nearly 70 years of research argues against depend-
ing on human supervision of automation in complex, safety-critical
environments without express consideration of the interdependent
capabilities and needs of both the automation and the human. It is
insufficient, inappropriate, and dangerous to automate everything
you can and leave the rest to the human. It is insufficient, inappro-
priate, and dangerous for NHTSA to allow automated vehicles to
be designed this way.
Beyond the research, consider the paradoxical expectations for
drivers who purchase and operate these automated vehicles. Dri-
vers are sold the fantasy of being a passenger at times6 but to the
manufacturer they never stopped being the fully-liable driver.
NHTSA seems to have acknowledged the surface of these issues
by providing human factors design guidance for Levels 2 and 3 be-
cause “safe and efficient operation… requires [vehicles] be designed
in a manner consistent with driver limitations, capabilities, and ex-
pectations” [Campbell et al. 2018]. However, this NHTSA guidance
does not address the fundamental crisis of confidence in the LOA
framework: can LOA appropriately regulate operations in complex
work environments like automated vehicles [Jamieson and Skraaning Jr.
2018; Lee 2018]? Does NHTSA’s LOA simply need to be imple-
mented beer? Or does NHTSAneed to completely reimagine their
framework beyond LOAfis who-does-what perspective?
To answer this question, NHTSA should follow its own advice
that “lessons learned through the aviation industryfis experience
with the introduction of automated systems may be instructive and
inform the development of thoughtful, balanced approaches” [NHT
2018]. In 1989, in response to high-profile fatal accidents, the Air
Transport Association of America (ATA) established a task force
to examine the impact of automation on aviation safety. eir pre-
scient conclusion remains true today [Billings 1997]:
During the 1970s and early 1980s… the concept
of automating as much as possible was consid-
ered appropriate. e expected benefits were a
5Two notable stipulations in the SAE standard expand the number and uncertainty of
vehicles states that the driver would be required to monitor. By definition, “Levels are
assigned, rather than measured, and reflect the design intent for the driving automation
system feature as defined by its manufacturer” (8.2, emphasis added). Even further,
the standard states that a system can deliver multiple features at different levels under
varying conditions (8.4).
6A survey of 1,212 owners of automated vehicles revealed that the “prevalence of
driversfi willingness to engage in other activities, look away from the roadway or rely
on the technology to the exclusion of ordinary safe driving practices… may indicate
lack of understanding or appreciation of the fact that these technologies are designed
to assist the driver, and that the driver is still required to be aentive and in control of
the vehicle at all times to ensure safety” [McDonald et al. 2018].
reduction in pilotworkload and increased safety…
Although many of these benefits have been re-
alized, serious questions have arisen and inci-
dents/accidents have occurred which question
the underlying assumption thatmaximumavail-
able automation is always appropriate or that
we understand how to design automated sys-
tems so that they are fully compatible with the
capabilities and limitations of the humans in
the system.
Designers of automated vehicles face the same decisions today
that aircra designers have faced for decades. Automation has the
potential to bring all the benefits of safety, reliability, economy, and
comfort to our roads that have been brought to our airspace. But
vehicle designers like Tesla and regulators like the NHTSA cannot
abdicate their responsibility to stop foreseeable and preventable
accidents by blaming the driver any more than aircra designers
can blame pilots. Aviation has already learned that tragedy should
not be the only time regulations and designs are reconsidered. As
automated vehicles begin driving in public spaces, entrusted with
the lives of drivers, passengers, and pedestrians, these vehicle de-
signers and regulators must learn from aviationfis tragic history of
tombstone design, rather than repeating it.
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